the phenomenology reader 5

Our second selection, “Beyond Intentionality”, first published in 1983, was specially composed for a collection of essays in which contemporary French philosophers set out their work in summary. Levinas elaborates some of the recurring themes in his thought, among them the claims that philosophical questions of being and meaning are opened up, not by our knowledge of the world, but in our response to the Other. For Husserl and his predecessors, the bestowal of meaning is taken as the thematisation of a particular presence; sense is bestowed on something as it becomes present to me. Perceptual presence is completed when the object is taken in hand and manipulated for my purposes. In its fullest sense, intentionality is both a pointing at something and a possessing of it. Here is found the non-metaphorical origin of the idea of truth as a conceptual grasp of things or adequation of thought and Being.

第二篇选文，《超越意向性》，首次出版于1983年，是特别为一组当代法国哲学家简要介绍其著作的文集而写作的。列维纳斯精心说明了一些其思想中重复的主题，其中有存在与意义的哲学问题的敞开断言，即不是因为我们关于世界的知识，而是对他者的回应（责任）。对于胡塞尔以及其前辈学者，意义的给予被当作是特别在场的主题化（主位化）；感觉是被给予的就好像它呈现给我一样。感知的在场当客体被为了我的目的而上手以及利用的时候是被完成了的（当客体是为了我的目的而上手和利用时，感知的在场是被完成的）。在其最广泛的意义上说，意向性是同时指向某物和拥有某物（意向性是指向某物并拥有之）。在这里就发现了真理的非隐喻性起源的观念（非形而上学起源的观念）作为对事物的概念性的领会或是思想与存在的等效物（非形而上学起源观念的真理作为事物的概念性领会或是思想与存在的适当的等价物）。

In this approach, being and meaning are equated with presence, and presence is whatever is amenable to the synthesising power of the subject; not only things but the past and future are made present as presences that were and will be, since all of them are thought together in the ideal, living present of awareness. Because the being that is external to thought is itself bound together by synthesising thought, adds Levinas, we end up with an idealism whereby the exteriority found in immanent experience is itself constituted immanently. Intentionality thus points reductively to the immanence of all exteriority. The self that grounds these representations, furthermore, is common to every person, and could just as well exist as a single consciousness.

依此途径方法，存在和意义就与在场被同等看待，在场则无论如何是服从主题（主体）的综合力量的；不仅仅是事物而且还有过去和未来都被当作过去和未来在场来呈现，因为它们全部被放在观念的、鲜活的意识在场中一起思考。由于存在相对于思想是客观的、外部的，它本身与思想一起受限于综合的思考，列维纳斯补充说，我们以观念论而结束，并藉此在内在经验中发现外在性是被其自身普遍地构建的。因此，意向性还原性的指向了所有外在性的内在。那个为这些表现而定基的自我，进一步说，是与每一个人都相同的，并且能够被当作一个单一的意识而存在。